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By analyzing earnings of observed immigrants workers, the literature on the economic as-
similation of immigrants has generally overlooked two potentially important selectivity issues.
First, earnings of immigrant workers may di®er substantially from those of non-workers. Sec-
ond, earnings of immigrants who do not return to their native country may di®er from earnings
of outmigrants. Economic theory has contradictory predictions on the signs of these potential
selection biases. This paper uses data drawn from 8 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel
and estimates a three-equation model of income, work and outmigration decisions taking into
account time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. We ¯nd strong evidence in
favor of negative outmigration selection in both the earnings and work equations. Simulation
results show that the magnitude of the outmigration bias is important.
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11 Introduction
One important policy parameter in the immigration literature concerns the measurement of the
convergence rate of earnings between immigrants and natives, formally referred to as the economic
assimilation rate. The importance of this measure are numerous. First, the economic bene¯ts of
immigration for a host country crucially depends on the earning di®erentials of natives and immi-
grants (Borjas, 1999). Second, successful assimilation leads to a reduction in earnings inequality in
the host economy as immigrants generally tend to be located at the bottom end of the host country
income distribution. Third, successful economic assimilation indicates that the labor market of the
host economy can absorb the labor force expansion that results from immigration.1 Finally, it has
recently been argued that economic growth can be positively linked with the social diversity of a
nation's inhabitants (Lazear, 1998; Durkin Jr., 1998).
Shultz (1998) recently pointed out that most studies estimating the economic assimilation rate
of migrants have two important shortcomings.2 First, most of these studies focus on earnings or
wages of working migrants. This is of concern as there are a variety of reasons to think that the
rules governing self-selection into the labor market may di®er between natives and immigrants.
One may think of returns to education and to labor force experience of immigrants which di®er
from those of natives. As these di®erences are likely to generate di®erent tradeo®s between leisure
and consumption, selection into work may be very di®erent in both groups. If selectivity into
work is correlated with labor market earnings, di®erential labor selectivity processes will lead to
inconsistent estimates of the assimilation rate.
Second, most empirical studies do not take into account of outmigration, whereas some immi-
grants return to their native country after some time abroad.3 The theoretical literature generally
models outmigration as an optimal decision resting on the savings behavior of the migrants, their
investment in human capital accumulation in the host country and the relative wage di®erentials
between host and home country. The motivation for outmigration can be justi¯ed on several
grounds: higher marginal utility of consumption in the home country (Dustmann and Kirchkamp,
2002; , Stark, Helmstein and Yogorov, 1995), high returns to human capital investments in the
host country (Dustmann (1997)) and information dissemination (Stark, 1995;1998). Stark (1998)
surveys the recent sociological literature on outmigration and adds to the list of factors shown to
be correlated with outmigration whether or not the spouse or children live outside the host coun-
1Dustmann (1996) analyzes the social assimilation of immigrants in Germany.
2For an historical overview on the measurement of the assimilation rate see Borjas (1999).
3Part of the return migration literature focuses on the performance of outmigrants in their home
economy upon remigration (e.g. Co, Gang and Yun, 2000 ; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2003).
2try, health satisfaction and integration perceptions . These results imply that outmigrants may
be immigrants with above average earnings, or the less successful immigrants with below average
earnings.
Because the econometric techniques to test for selectivity bias are now well established4, it
might seem surprising that few results exists on the presence, direction and magnitude of work and
outmigration selectivity and its e®ect on the measurement of economic assimilation. We believe
that two reasons can explain the lack of empirical evidence.
First, most studies have adopted the framework of Borjas (1985) who used repeated cross sec-
tions of data to infer the assimilation rate of immigrants in the United States. These repeated
cross-sections pose substantial challenges in the presence of work and outmigration selectivity as
the composition of cohorts change over the years. More importantly, it does not allow to model
work and outmigration based on individual speci¯c time-varying and time invariant characteristics
of immigrants. Hu (2000) compares assimilation rates of immigrants living in the United States
using two data sources, a series of repeated census based data sets and a longitudinal sample from
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) not subject to outmigration. Using quantile regression
techniques, Hu ¯nds signi¯cant negative outmigration selectivity, which indicates that outmigrants
are drawn from the bottom end of the host country's income distribution. One drawback of Hu's
analysis is that he does not control for individual unobserved heterogeneity, primarily due to the
lack of guidance in controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in quantile regressions models. Failing
to take into account of unobserved heterogeneity in nonlinear models can lead to biased and incon-
sistent estimates of the model parameters (see Cameron and Heckman, 1998 for a nice proof of this
result). Furthermore, his estimates do not take into account of work selectivity which, as argued
above, may lead to biased estimates of the assimilation rate. Closely related to the current paper
is Dustmann (1993) who studies economic assimilation of temporary and permanent immigrants
living in West-Germany. Using one wave of the immigrant sample of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP), he ¯nds that outmigrants have less incentives to invest in human capital than
permanent immigrants. These lower investments may not be su±cient to these migrants' earnings
to catch up with those of native workers and would lead to conclude to a lack of assimilation. Again,
the use of a single cross-section of data prevents any test of work and outmigration selectivity.
Second, part of the scarcity of empirical tests of outmigration bias can be attributed to the
mere fact that it is reliable indicator of individual outmigration. Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) proxy
4Pagan and Ullah (1999) present an overview of parametric and semiparametric methods to
control for selectivity.
3return migration with observed sample attrition . Since outmigration is embedded in panel attrition,
this could lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the underlying model parameters (See Bound
et al. 2001 for a survey of this literature.). In other cases, identi¯cation of outmigration rests on
comparisons of descriptives of cohorts across censuses. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1990) heuristically
document the importance of return migration in the U.S. but do not have direct information on
the magnitude or direction of return migration selectivity in terms of earnings.
This paper is a ¯rst attempt to test for the presence, direction and magnitude of work and out-
migration selectivity and to document its impact on immigrant assimilation. Our methodology can
brie°y be summarized as followed. First, an econometric model where labor market earnings, labor
force participation and outmigration are modelled jointly is estimated, controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual level. In this paper, panel attrition is taken as a proxy for outmi-
gration. Second, we propose a new and simple way to deal with the problem that panel attrition
partially reveals outmigration. Speci¯cally, our empirical model nonparametrically identi¯es and
estimates the probability that panel attrition may be confounded with outmigration and provides
estimate of the outmigration process and its impact on earnings and work. The implications of this
partial observability on model estimates are also discussed. Third, we estimate the model using 8
waves of the German Socio-Economic panel which contains detailed information on labor market
and sociological factors believed to be related with outmigration. By allowing outmigration to be
related to economic and sociological variables, we contribute to the understanding of the interplay
between economic success and social integration of immigrants living abroad.
Our main ¯ndings are the following. First, there is a strong negative outmigration bias a®ecting
both work propensities and labor market earnings. simulation results indicate that average log
earnings of outmigrants remained roughly 18% lower than those of immigrant stayers, a clear
indication that outmigrants are drawn from the bottom of the income distribution. Second, our
empirical model estimates the annual outmigration rate to be of roughly 3% per annum, a ¯gure
in line with those commonly found in the migration literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the state of immigration in
Germany and the historical policies that have been implemented to favor and curb immigration
°ows. It also presents the data used in the paper. Section 3 presents the econometric model used
to model outmigration in conjunction with the work decision and labor market income. Section 4
discusses the empirical results of the model and tests for the presence of outmigration bias. Section
5 presents some simulation results to quantify the impact of outmigration selectivity. Section 6
4concludes.
2 Background and Data
The historical in°ow of immigrants in Germany has never been stable. The period of post-war
adjustment saw a tremendous decolonization of former Soviet economies. For example, 12 million
Germans left eastern Europe by 1950, with 8 million coming to West-Germany (Zimmermann,
1995; pp.46). Between 1955 and 1973, the strong economic development across northern Europe
paved the way to an increase demand for labor and led to a large in°ow of migrants mainly from
the southern European countries and Turkey. The percentage of foreign born workers employed in
West-Germany increased from 0.6% in 1957 to 11.2% in 1973.
Bilateral recruitment agreements between Germany and Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal
and Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s reduced the migrants' cost of migration considerably: workers
entered Germany with a 1 year working contract, they could not be dismissed during the ¯rst year,
travel costs we reimbursed, and employers had to provide accommodation. After the oil shock
in 1973, recruitment stopped, but families and dependents of the immigrants living in Germany
continued to °ow in. In 1984, in light of di±cult labor market conditions, the government issued
a repatriation scheme which gave ¯nancial incentives to outmigrate. The scheme consisted of
reimbursement of travel costs to any immigrant living in Germany who wished to return to his
home country. In 1999, the Nationality Act was amended with the objective to facilitate the
naturalization of foreigners entering the country and to adapt immigration °ows to the requirements
of the German economy (OECD, 2001). One immediate action of the government was to vote the
Nationality Code in July 1999. This code attempts to make it easier for foreigners to obtain the
German nationality.
The data used in this paper is taken from the public use ¯le of the German Socio-Economic
Panel and covers the 1984-1999 period. The data consists of several subsamples which were drawn
at di®erent points in time and for di®erent purposes. Until 1990, the GSEOP data was separated
into two subsamples, A and B. Sample A consists of households with German heads living in the
former West-Germany. Sample B consists of an oversample of immigrants living in West-Germany
coming from countries which had signed a bilateral migration agreement with Germany in the
1950s and 1960s namely Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia5. Data on speaking °uency,
integration feelings of immigrants, intended length of stay and remittances directed to their family
5Immigrants of Portuguese nationality were not included in the panel.
5living outside Germany where given in consecutive waves from 1984 until 1987. Starting in 1987,
this information was gathered every other year. In order to keep constant the time period between
observations, we have chosen to keep the 8 waves of the panel coinciding with full information waves,
each spanned by one year, starting in 1985 and ending in 1999. Following the literature measuring
the economic assimilation rate (e.g. Borjas, 1985,1999; Hu, 2000), we restrict our attention to males
between 18-64 between 1984 and 1999. Excluded from the sample are individuals who died during
the observation period and individuals who gave incomplete information on any single variable
entering the empirical model in any of the 8 waves. This leaves us with a sample of 1987 native
Germans and 732 immigrants starting in 1985.
Sample attrition over time is a prominent feature of this data. Table 1 contains information on
the number of individuals observed along with the percentage of the original 1985 subsample who
remains in a given wave. We can see from table that 41,9% of Germans and 26,7% of immigrants
who were present in the panel remained remained in 1999. The wave speci¯c attrition rate is
de¯ned as the percentage of individuals not observed in a wave but which were observed in the
previous wave. Over our sample period, an average of 11% of the remaining Germans and 17%
of immigrants drop out of the panel every two years. In the case of Germans, outmigration is
de facto not an issue. For immigrants, distinguishing which amount of drop outs constitute real
panel attrition from outmigration is di±cult. Assuming immigrants have the same rate of normal
attrition than Germans, our data indicates an outmigration rate of roughly 6% every two years,
or 3% per annum. This number is in line with those reported by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) for
outmigrants living in the U.S.
Figure 1 shows the sample frequencies of individuals reporting working in the month preceding
the interview. We can see that until 1991, labor force participation was very similar for both
Germans and immigrants. After 1991, we observe a steady decline in the work frequencies for
both sub-groups. During that period, the work frequency of immigrants remained steadily below
that of Germans. The severe drop in work frequencies for both subgroups coincides with the
general deterioration of the labor market in the regions of former West-Germany. Table 2 gives
the unemployment rate per year by state. With the exception of Berlin whose best performance
occurred in 1989, all provinces experienced their lowest unemployment rate of the 1985-1999 period
in 1991. After 1991, the unemployment rate has progressively risen apart from a slight fall in 1999
for most landers, except Berlin and Bavaria. These ¯gures explain part of the general decrease in
work frequencies but they do not account for the divergence in work activity between Germans and
immigrants which, as for earnings, seems to widen over the years.
6The diverging economic progress of Germans and immigrants after 1991 is also re°ected in
the monthly income data. Figure 2 shows the average monthly gross income given for working
immigrant and natives over the period covered. At the start in 1985, the mean income of Germans
was 3357 DM per month compared to 2690 DM per month for immigrants, giving an income ratio
of 1,25 favoring Germans. This mean wage di®erential remaind relatively steady until 1991, after
which, the mean income di®erential widened even more between the two groups to reach a ratio of
1,34 in 1999, with Germans receiving an average monthly wage of 5848 DM while immigrants were
receiving 4348 DM per month.
Table 3 gives variable descriptions and summary statistics for both groups for the 1985 and
1999 waves. Germans and immigrants are on average of similar age. For a given mean age,
Germans have acquired more years of education at the expense of lower labor market experience
relative to immigrants. The table also shows several variables argued above to be correlated with
the return migration behavior. We ¯nd that on average age at immigration was approximately
24 years and this seems rather consistent through out the observation period. This implies that
most of our immigrants were adults when migration occurred and hence, they are likely to have
taken themselves the migration decision. Reported integration feeling and reported speaking °uency
improve over time while health satisfaction seem to deteriorate. This could be due to an aging e®ect.
Immigration year does not change for a given individual in the panel. We ¯nd that between 1985
and 1999, immigrants who have immigrated the earliest tend to have dropped out of the panel. This
is consistent with the ¯nding that average outmigration movements occurs 20 years after migration
(OECD, 2002), which for the sample at hand, occurred somewhere between 1985 and 1999. Family
structure variable show a diverging patten between both waves. While 73% of immigrants reported
having a spouse living outside Germany, a mere 1% report this still being the case in 1999. On the
one hand, this could re°ect the fact that spouses eventually migrated to Germany during the time
period or that immigrants whose spouse was living abroad outmigrated. Reported children living
outside Germany also shows this pattern as 14% of the immigrants reported having children of
that age. This dramatic fall could simply re°ect the fact that over this long period, these children
became adults. another explanation would be that immigrants with children living abroad were
more likely to return and leave Germany.
3 Model and Estimation Method
We have a random sample of N immigrants in the ¯rst period of observation, and each individual
i remains in the panel for a Ti periods. In each period t, we observe an immigrants labor market
7status, his monthly earnings if he works, and whether or not he will drop out of the panel at time
t + 1. The data for Germans is simpler as it simply consists of work and monthly earnings given
work. In this section, we present in detail the model for any sequences of observed outcomes of
immigrants. The likelihood of a particular sequence of outcomes for Germans is a special case and
will not be discussed. We then discuss the economic implications of the model. The section ends
with a description of the estimation of the log-likelihood function.










where xit is a vector of observed characteristics, ¯ are unknown population constants, ´1
i is a
unobserved time invariant individual speci¯c component of income while "1
it represents a stochastic
shocks. The earnings of immigrants are only observable when the immigrant work in a given period.







where zit is a vector of observed characteristics, µ are unknown population constants, ´2
i is an
unobserved idiosyncratic component of work and "2
it represents some stochastic shocks to the labor
market. Participation is observed according to the observation rule pit = 1[p¤
it > 0]. When pit = 1,
earnings wit are observed. Both ´1
i and ´2
i can be thought of capturing immigrants unobserved
ability to generate higher earnings and to ¯nd jobs yielding wages above his reservation wage.
Finally, an immigrants unobservable outmigration propensity r¤







where sit are observed factors in°uencing outmigration, ° are unknown population constants, ´3
i
captures the individual's individual speci¯c attachment to his native country and "3
it captures
random shocks.







is observed by the immi-
grants but not by the econometrician.
Let ru
it = 1[r¤
it > 0] be the true but unobserved outmigration indicator which takes a value of 1
when the immigrant decides to return in the period t+1 and 0 otherwise. In most panel data sets,
8we observe ro
it, whether an immigrant drops out of the panel, but not ru
it, whether he returns to his
native country. To the extent that a signi¯cant amount of those immigrants who leave the panel
do not leave Germany, the attrition indicator partially reveals the true unobserved outmigration
indicator. We address the issue of partial observability by ¯rst noting that the probability of


























it = 1) is set to 1 since an immigrant who returns must always leave the panel. On the
other hand, Pr(ro
it = 1jru
it = 0) = ®10 implies that there is a positive probability that an immigrant
drops out of the panel given he stays in Germany. This parameter will be incorporated directly in
the likelihood function below and is nonparametrically identi¯ed from limit observations who have










The earnings, work and outmigration outcomes are not likely to be independent of each other.
This will be case if, for example, immigrants who ¯nds work very easily and/or who earns a high
income are more reluctant to outmigrate. Furthermore, there can be intertemporal dependencies







treated either as ¯xed unknown constants or as random variables. The main advantage of the
¯xed e®ect approach does not require that included explanatory variables be strictly exogenous to
unobserved heterogeneity. However, estimation of ¯xed e®ects in nonlinear models remains today
a sizeable complication, with very little guidance in the choice of models (see the recent review of
Arrelano and Honore, 2002). A second drawback of ¯xed e®ect estimation is that by treating the
unobserved heterogeneity components as ¯xed, cross equation correlations which drive selection
bias in our model are not identi¯ed. As the present paper is mainly concerned with selection issues,
¯xed e®ect estimation would limit our insights in the type of selections present in the data. We
therefore introduce these dependencies via the stochastic time-invariant e®ects, which we assume
6The is mathematically equivalent to the class of discrete choice models where the endogenous
discrete outcome is either misclassi¯ed or misreported. Recent applications of these models include
regime switching models (Lee and Porter, 1984), work status (Hausman et al., 1998), reported
speaking °uency (Dustman and van Soest, 2001) and work transition data (Abrevaya and Hausman,
2001)





















´j denotes the variances of the unobserved heterogeneity components, and ½
´
i;j denotes their
correlations.7 These correlations are indicative of whether or not work and return migration induce
positive or negative selection e®ects on the observed earnings distribution based on their individual
unobserved characteristics. A signi¯cant and positive ½
´
1;2 signi¯es that individuals who are more
likely to work are also more likely to have higher earnings. This is the familiar selection e®ect
introduced in labor economics by Heckman (1978). ½
´
1;3 has a similar interpretation and captures
return migration bias. We expect a negative estimate if conditional on unobserved individual
heterogeneity, immigrants who have a higher probability of returning to their native country have
below average monthly income in a given time period and a positive estimate if these individuals
have above average monthly earnings. Finally, ½
´
2;3 can be interpreted as measuring outmigration
bias for the work decision which would occur with a negative estimate as individuals with a higher
probability of returning to their native country are also those more likely not to be working in a
given time period.






¤0 is i.i.d normally distributed with mean 0


















w is the variance of log earnings, while the variances of the unobserved stochastic shocks
entering the work and return migration equations are set to 1 for identi¯cation purposes. Con-












is drawn from a discrete distribution with domain D. We have estimated the model








for k = 1;:::;8 where
P8
k=1 ¼k = 1. Results were relatively similar to those presented here and are
available upon request.
103.1 Economic implications of the model
In this paper, we aim to characterize work and return migration selection bias and it's impact on
average conditional wage of immigrants. Heckman's (1978) seminal paper derived an expression for
the conditional expected earnings with worker selectivity assuming joint normality of the stochastic
shocks. Heckman's results apply directly to evaluate the expected conditional income of German
workers








where Á(¢) and ©(¢) are respectively the standard normal density and distribution functions. The
conditional log earnings function of immigrants conditions both on work and outmigration status.
Generalizations of this results to the case of multiple binary selectivity have since appeared (see
e.g. Pudney (1990)) but do not apply here as one of our selectivity indicators is misreported. The
following proposition generalizes previous sample selection results to the case where one binary














































where W10 (sit;®10) ! 0 and W11 (sit;®10) ! 1 when ®10 ! 0
Proof. See Appendix A.
The results of the proposition are non-parametric in the sense that they do not rely on any
distributional assumptions apart from ®10 being independent of background characteristics. It
shows that the expected conditional wage of immigrants who will leave in the next period is a
weighted average of the expected conditional earnings of return and non return migrants, where
the weights are functions of the measurement error probability ®10. In general, this conditional
expected income of those who drop out of the panel will not coincide with that of return migrants
unless the return migration indicator is perfectly measured (®10 = 0). At the opposite, the expected
conditional wage of immigrants who do not drop out of the panel coincides with that of immigrants
who do not outmigrate. On the one hand, this result seems trivial as individuals who do not drop
out of the panel and known to remain in the Germany with probability one, hence they constitute a
11sample of non-returners. What is more surprising is that they constitute a random sample on non-
returners which implies that expected conditional income estimates could in principle be carried
out in a given wave using only those immigrants who are observed to be in the panel, ignoring the
information of those immigrants who drop out of the panel but who do not return.
The proposition also has implications in terms of estimation. In principle, one could esti-
mate the parameters of the model by using a two step procedure. In the ¯rst step, the out-
migration and the work decisions could be estimated jointly. In the second step, one can use





























to the relative ine±ciency of two step estimators and to the complexity in computing the second
step covariance matrix, we prefer to estimate the model using Maximum Likelihood.
3.2 Maximum Likelihood estimation
To simplify the presentation of the likelihood function, we divide the observable characteristics
of immigrant i into a set yi = fpit;ro
it;(witjpit = 1)g
Ti
t=1 of dependent variables and a set Xi =
fxit;zit;sitg
Ti
t=1 of exogenous variables, the latter assumed to be non-stochastic. Moreover, we use









to indicate the trivariate normal
density conditional on the random e®ects.
Numerical approximation of the likelihood function proceeds in two steps. In the ¯rst step, the






is computed holding the unob-



































This equation collapses to a familiar continuous and discrete choice model when there is no mis-
classi¯cation error in the return migration indicator (®10 = 0). The sets Wit and Pit de¯ne the
domain of integration over the wage and work propensity spaces and vary over time as individuals
12make di®erent choices in each period according to the following table
Integration domains in period t
Wit Pit
Work ¡ [0;1)
Not Work (¡1;1) (¡1;0]
Income is integrated out in waves where it is not observed. When an individual works, no integration
takes place. The integration domain for the work propensity follows from the work decision rule.
In the second step of the estimation procedure, the unconditional likelihood function is obtained

















where H denotes the trivariate normal distribution function with covariance matrix ­.
To solve the numerical integration problem, we approximate the integral by a simulated mean:










is taken from the multivariate normal
distribution H at a given value of ­.8 For each draw, the conditional likelihood function fC is



















The resulting estimator is inconsistent for ¯xed R but will be consistent if R tends to in¯nity with
the number of observations N. If
p
N=R ! 0 and with independent drawings across individuals,
the method is asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood (see Train (2003) for details).
Finally, we model labor market earnings and work decisions of Germans using similar speci-
¯cations of equations (??) and (2) and estimate the parameters using the simulation techniques
described above.
4 Results and simulations
We include in the earnings and work equations education, labor market experience, labor market
experience squared, self reported German speaking °uency, and the number of years since immigra-
tion to Germany. These are the standard variables that have appeared in this literature (Borjas,
1999). The provincial unemployment rate for the period is added in both equations to capture
regional macroeconomic trends in the state of the labor market along with time ¯xed e®ects. We
8In this paper, we use sequences of Halton draws to reduce simulation noise (see Train (2003)).
13use reported health satisfaction as the exclusion restriction in the work equation. Reported health
satisfaction serve as a useful exclusion restriction if health problems occur in the second half of
an individuals productive life, at a time where immigrants are more likely to have secured a long
term jobs whose wages are no longer related to their intrinsic productivity but whose continuation
strictly depends on the workers choices.
The outmigration propensity is modelled as being a function of a series of variables which
have been identi¯ed in the literature as important determinants of outmigration. These can be
classi¯ed depending on whether they refer to positive or negative selectivity. Theories of negative
outmigration selectivity commonly argue that migrants who perform poorly or are dissatis¯ed with
their lives in the host country will remigrate. The variables we included to capture this state are
whether or not the immigrants wife lives in Germany, the immigrants self reported integration in the
German society, the unemployment rate. More positive theories of outmigration argue that young
migrants build up human capital and ¯nancial assets in the host country and are the most likely to
return. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) show some evidence that some of the Turkish outmigrants
were successful in Germany and had enough ¯nancial assets to start their own businesses upon their
return. Accordingly, we include an immigrants age at arrival in Germany and cumulative amount
of money sent back to their native country since 1984. We have also included reported health
satisfaction and the migrants self-reported expected length of stay in Germany. Time dummies are
added to capture remaining macroeconomic °uctuations.
The main contribution of this paper is to incorporate both work and return migration selectivity
in a model of earnings determination. Accordingly, we need some benchmarks to compare the full
speci¯cation. We have estimated a single equation earnings function with random e®ects and a two
equation random e®ects model of earnings and work. We have also experimented with an alternative
speci¯cation of the return migration propensity which added education, labor market experience
and its square, speaking °uency and years since immigration as regressors. A log-likelihood ratio
test of the null hypothesis that these human capital collectively have no e®ect on return migration
could not be rejected at conventional levels.9
4.1 Equation results
4.1.1 Covariance structure
We begin our analysis of the results with a discussion of the estimates characterizing the covariance
structure of the unobserved components as these can be very informative of the di®erences which
9Results are available upon request.
14we can ¯nd in the systematic parts of each equations. Table 4 contains the covariance structure
of the unobserved components for a series of models characterized by either no or some control for
work and return migration selectivity. Looking at the results of the full model, results of Table
4 indicate that the unobserved components of return migration show strong patterns of negative
correlation across transitory shocks. Shocks between income and work and shocks between work
and return migration are signi¯cantly negatively correlated, the former at -34.2% and the latter
at 30.4% while we do not ¯nd signi¯cant correlation between the transitory shocks of the income
and return migration processes. Of greater interest for this paper are the correlations between
the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity terms show a di®erent pattern. First, we ¯nd a small
but signi¯cant positive correlation between the income and work equations. If one interprets these
unobserved components as re°ecting unobserved ability, then this would imply that higher ability
individuals who ¯nd work and also more likely to have higher incomes. The correlations between
the time invariant correlations between the return migration equation and the earnings equation
is -56% while that between return migration and and work propensity is -49.8%, both signi¯cant
at the 1% level. We interpret these results as evidence suggesting that individuals with higher
unobserved individual propensity to remigrate are also those individuals more likely to have lower
work propensities and lower earnings, which clearly points to a negative economic selection e®ect
of return migration.
4.1.2 Earnings equation
Table 5 presents parameter estimates of the earnings and work equations for the immigrant and
German samples for the three equation model and the two benchmark cases. We will ¯rst focus of
the results from the three equation model and contrasts it to the benchmark models later on.
Part of the income disparity between Germans and immigrants can be accounted for by di®erent
returns to human capital investments. We ¯nd that returns to education of immigrants are roughly
one third that of Germans, with an increase in one year of schooling generating monthly income
increases of a little more than 9% for Germans and a little less than 2.9% for immigrants. These
discrepancies can also be observed by comparing returns to labor market experience. We ¯nd that
those returns to increase almost twice as fast for West-Germans than for immigrants. The quadratic
term on labor market experience shows that the sharp rise in returns to labor market experience
°attens out more quickly for Germans than for immigrants. Immigrants with better speaking
°uency have higher earnings.10 Finally, we ¯nd that the unemployment rate has a negative impact
10Dustmann and van Soest (2001) have shown that the self-reported speaking °uency indicator of
the GSEOP is measured with noise, a feature which biased downward the e®ect of speaking °uency
15of immigrants wages (at the 10% signi¯cance level) while it has no statistical e®ect on the earnings
of Germans. One explanation for this is that immigrants take up jobs without job-security and
secure income which makes them more prone to accept lower income in periods of downturn.
We ¯nd the returns to education of immigrants to be lower when outmigration is incorporated
in the model, with returns for one extra year of schooling passing from 3,46% to 2,88%. The
coe±cient of years since migration increases progressively as selection is added, passing from 0.069
without any selection to 0.073 when controlling for work selection and to 0.079 when both work
return migration selectivities are accounted for, but these increases are not statistically signi¯cant.
We ¯nd that the linear term in labor market experience increases slightly when outmigration is
included, while the coe±cient of the quadratic term in labor market experience decreases, both
changes not signi¯cant at conventional levels.
The economic assimilation rate of immigrants is generally estimated to be the earnings di®er-
ential between immigrants and natives attributed to the e®ect of one extra year of labor market
work plus immigrants returns to one extra year of immigration. We evaluated the assimilation
rate at the sample average labor market experience of immigrants in 1985. We ¯nd an estimate of
the assimilation rate of -5% per year when outmigration is not taken into account and a rate of
-4.78% when outmigration is accounted for, the di®erence not statistically signi¯cant at the 10%
level. Both estimates clearly point that assimilation is not taking place in Germany. Furthermore,
estimates of the assimilation rates are robust to outmigration selectivity.
4.1.3 Work equation
The results of the work participation equation are generally in line with those of the earnings
equation. For both immigrants and Germans, all parameters are statistically signi¯cant. Both
education and labor force experience have similar patterns to those found in the earnings equation.
State unemployment rate has a negative e®ect of work participation for both immigrants and
natives. Health satisfaction which serves as the inclusion restriction is signi¯cant and positive both
for Immigrants and Germans. Increased speaking °uency has a positive e®ect on work participation
while years since immigration has a negative and signi¯cant impact on work participation. Like in
the income equation, we ¯nd that parameter estimates of the immigrant work propensity are quite
robust to return migration selectivity. The only noticeable di®erence concerns the negative e®ect
of the state level unemployment rate, whose coe±cient passes from -0.054 to -0.076 when return




In a recent paper, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) study the performance of Turkish return
migrants who previously lived in Germany. Their empirical work is based on a sample of Turkish
immigrants who enjoyed relative success in Germany as a substantial portion of them were observed
to have invested in entrepreneurial activities upon their return. The interesting feature of that paper
is that it points to the existence of positive rather than negative outmigration. Since the current
paper is estimated on the basis of a sample of immigrants living in Germany, it is instructive to
test whether a dominant form of outmigration selectivity emerges.
Our discussion of the correlations between the unobserved heterogeneity components clearly
pointed in favor of negative outmigration selectivity in the sense that individuals whose unob-
served characteristics generated for them lower work propensity and lower income given work are
most likely to remigrate. Recall that positive and negative theories of return migration selectivity
additionally point to the potential role of several observed characteristics which could determine
return migration. Table 6 presents the parameter estimates of the earnings and work equations
for the immigrant and German samples. We ¯nd that immigrants whose wife lives with them in
Germany have a signi¯cantly lower probability of remigrating which would imply a strict preference
for family. Immigrants satis¯ed with their health are signi¯cantly less likely to remigrate. Intended
length of stay captures the expectations of immigrants and o®er direct information on their rem-
igration intentions. Not surprisingly, the results show that those migrans who expect to remain
longer in Germany are also less likely to remigrate. One interpretation of this result would be that
immigrants have rational expectations and act accordingly. It does seem that for most re-migrants,
the remigration decision is planned and although there can be deviations from this plan, on average
they will stick to it. A planned remigration may be evidence of a strict preference for consumption
in home country. The coe±cient of the state unemployment rate is positive and signi¯cant, indi-
cating that deteriorations of labor market conditions and social distress increase the likelihood of
remigrating. This parallels our ¯nding that negative labor market shocks are associated with pos-
itive remigration shocks and that individuals with lower unobserved propensity to work are more
likely to outmigrate. Taken together, these results indicate that integration in the host country's
labor market is one of the most important determinants of outmigration behavior. The e®ect of
cumulative savings returned to the home country is not signi¯cant, implying that immigrants who
have saved and returned more money to their native country are not more likely to return. Since
age at immigration is signi¯cant, we cannot completely rule out the positive selectivity theory to
17outmigration. Finally, the insigni¯cant coe±cient of immigrants feeling of integration is society
indicate that social integration does not explain outmigration, once we have conditioned on all the
other factors and controlled for unobserved heterogeneity.
In our data, natives have a 11% attrition rate per two years, while the observed attrition rate
of immigrants is 17%. If immigrants have the same normal attrition rate as Germans, than the
di®erence in observed attrition rates between natives and immigrants, here 3% per year, would
be an estimate of immigrants outmigration rate. We do not have direct information indicating
that immigrants have the same normal attrition rate than natives. However, panel attrition occurs
either because individuals decide to stop participating in the survey project, or individuals move
within Germany and cannot be tracked by the survey institution. Clark and Drever (2001) have
shown that immigrants in the GSEOP subsample are not more likely to move within Germany than
natives. Furthermore, Pischke and Velling (1997) have shown that immigrants in the western parts
of Germany live is regions with a high concentration of ethnic minorities. Both ¯ndings imply that
immigrants are not more di±cult to track than native Germans, which provides indirect evidence
that the normal attrition rates of both groups should be of similar magnitude. Our empirical model
in section 2 explicitly incorporated the parameter ®10 corresponding to the probability of dropping
out of the panel, given that an immigrant remains in Germany. Notice that by de¯nition, ®10
represents the normal attrition rate of immigrants. If the normal attrition rate of immigrants is
indeed the same as that of Germans, we would expect ®10 to to be close to 11%. This conjecture
is veri¯ed in the data. We ¯nd that ®10 is estimated to be 10.7%, remarkably close to the attrition
rate of Germans. These results reinforces our belief that incorporating ®10 in our model allows us
to identify outmigration in our sample of immigrants.
4.2 Simulations
Simulations are used for two purposes. First, they allow to asses the goodness of ¯t of the model.
Secondly, they allow us to quantify the implications of outmigration selectivity on log monthly
earnings and work propensities of immigrants.
Simulations performed to evaluate the overall ¯t of the model are presented in Table 7.Sim-
ulated log earnings represent the average over 1000 simulated expected average log earnings. A










t=1 for each individual in the sample and averaging ¯tted log earnings over
all individuals who are predicted to work. The ¯t for the German sample is very good, with both
real and simulated paths closely following each other over the entire sample period. Simulated log
18earnings paths of immigrants are good up till 1991, after which, the model tends to over predict
the monthly log earnings. Part of these discrepancies can be attributed to the progressively small
immigrant sample sizes in the latter years, a fact re°ected in the increasing dispersion of the sim-
ulated log earnings estimates over time. Table 7 tabulates the inter-quartile range de¯ned as the
di®erence between the 97.5% and the 2.5% quantile of the simulated expected income distribution
for Germans and immigrants. The dispersion increases from 0.164 in 1985 to 0.289 in 1995 while
it increases from 0.052 to 0.069 for Germans during the same period. Table 7 also presents real
and simulated work propensities of Germans and immigrants. The predicted participation rates
over the entire sample period.follows very closely those found in the data for both Germans and
immigrants.
Our empirical results indicated that outmigrants were selected from the bottom of the earnings
and work propensity distributions of the immigrant population. To gain an insight in the magnitude
of these biases, we report in Figure 3 simulations of log earnings and work propensities for the full
sample of immigrants, immigrants predicted to be present in Germany and predicted outmigrants
for all sample waves. Simulations of log earnings are presented in the top panel while simulated work
propensities are presented in the lower panel. The log earnings of outmigrants where 17.2% lower
than those of stayers in 1985. This gap widened to 20.1% in 1991 before dropping back to a gap
of 17.7% in 1997. The gap in work propensities between stayers and outmigrants also con¯rms the
strong negative outmigration selectivity. Outmigrants are predicted to be have a work propensity
25% lower than that of immigrant stayers in 1985 and reaches a high of 44% in 1995. These
simulation results clearly indicate that outmigration, apart from being statistically signi¯cant, has
a substantial quantitative economic impact, namely that the economic performance of outmigrants
in the wave preceding their departure was dramatically worse than that of immigrants stayers.
Finally, Proposition 1 showed that the average earnings of immigrants who drop out of the
panel will be a weighted average of the average earnings of immigrant stayers and outmigrants. In
terms of the results of ¯gure 3, this implies that the average earnings of immigrants who drop out
lies in between the average earnings schedule of immigrant stayers and outmigrants. The average
earnings of drop outs will be further from those of outmigrants the higher is the probability of
confounding attrition for outmigration. Hence, taking panel attrition as the outmigration indicator
leads to overestimate the level of earnings of outmigrants in our data.
195 Conclusions
International evidence suggests that outmigration is an economic phenomenon of sizable impor-
tance. It has traditionally been put forward that there are economic gains to skills complementary,
which would favor an immigration policy open to attracting low skilled workers. Simulation evi-
dence has revealed that gains from complementarity of skills of immigrants may well be too low
to overcome the costs immigrants impose on the welfare system (Borjas, 1999b). As a result, it is
now more and more believed that a nation will gain from immigration if 1) migrants who assimilate
quickly and perform well in the host labor market remain in the host country and 2) unsuccessful
migrants leave. Because the hosts countries economic bene¯ts of immigration depend on the earn-
ings di®erential between natives and immigrants, testing whether or not outmigrants are drawn
from the bottom of top part of the income distribution of immigrants in the host country is of
primary interest for policy makers.
Up to know, the empirical evidence on outmigration selectivity is scant, primarily because of
the di±culty in measuring outmigration without error. This paper is a ¯rst attempt to test for
the presence, direction and magnitude of outmigration selectivity. We propose a new econometric
methodology to address the problem of partial observability of the outmigration indicator. The
approach consists of explicitly introducing a probability that sample attrition is confounded for
outmigration. This probability is shown to be nonparametrically identi¯ed and can be incorporated
in a straightforward way in a model jointly determining earnings, work and outmigration. We
estimate the model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using data on immigrants living in
Germany between 1985-1999.
Our empirical results indicate that outmigrants are negatively selected in labor market earn-
ings and work propensities. Simulation results show that the magnitude of outmigration e®ects
are sizable. Through out the sample period, we ¯nd that outmigrants have roughly 18% lower
labor market earnings and a 30% lower work propensity than immigrants who remain in Germany.
Parameter estimates of the earnings and work equations are found to be robust to outmigration
selectivity, implying outmigration mostly shifts vertically the earnings function and work propensi-
ties. Furthermore, we have shown that not controlling for the partial observability of outmigration
would impute higher earnings to outmigrants than actually occurred. We have estimated the out-
migration rate to be roughly 3% per year, a ¯gure in line with those previously reported in the
literature.
20A Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we derive the expression of the conditional expectation of income of workers used in
the simulations of section. Heckman (1978) derived the result for the case of normal errors and one
binary selection equation which served as the basis of the now famous two-step estimator. Since,
extensions of the Heckman derivation have been made along three lines, a more general treatment
of the selection indicator, multiple selectivity, panel data and semiparametric methods.
To prove the result, we will need the following two lemmas
Lemma 2 De¯ne W`j (sit) ´ Pr(du
it = jjdo
it = `;sit) for fj;`g 2 f0;1g £ f0;1g. Then,
a)
W00 (sit) =
(1 ¡ ®10) + (®10 ¡ 1)Pr(du
it = 1jsit)





(1 ¡ ®10) + (®10 + ®01 ¡ 1)Pr(du
it = 1jsit)
W10 (sit) =
®10 ¡ ®10 Pr(du
it = 1jsit)





®10 + (1 ¡ ®10 ¡ ®01)Pr(du
it = 1jsit)
with W00 (sit) + W01 (sit) = 1 and W10 (sit) + W11 (sit) = 1.
b) In the special case where do
it su®ers from 1 sided misclassi¯cation (say ®01 = 0), then
W00 (sit) = 1 and W01 (sit) = 0 while W10 (sit) and W11 (sit) have values in (0;1).
Proof. By Bayes rule, these weights have simple close form solutions
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where the last equality follows from assumption of random misclassi¯cation. In a similar fashion
we can derive the closed form expression of the second weight













(1 ¡ ®10) + (®10 + ®01 ¡ 1)Pr(du
it = 1jsit)
It follows immediately that W00 (sit)+W01 (sit) = 1. Because W01 (sit) = 0 in the special case of a
one sided misclassi¯cation probability (®01 = 0), it immediately follows that W10 (sit) = 1. Similar





























and we omit the conditioning on Xit until the end.
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where the last equality follows by the fact that the misclassi¯cation probabilities Pr(do
it = `jy;du
it = j;pit = 1)
are independent of yit (and also pit), hence they cancel out in the numerator and denominator.












it is a misclassi¯ed binary selectivity indicator of the true but
unobserved indicator du












































where the second equality follows from Lemma 2 and intuitively means that the noisy indicator
does not reveal more on the mean conditional income function once knowledge of the true indicator
is known. Using Lemma 2, this expression can be expressed as a weighted average of the expected
workers earnings when they remain in West-Germany and expected earnings when they return to

































where the weights W`
0 (sit) and W`
1 (sit) are given in Lemma 1. When one of the misclassi¯cation
probabilities is zero (say ®01 = 0), we can use the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to solve for
the two following cases
Case do
it = 0 :
When ®01 = 0, W0
0 (sit) = 1 and W0





















which is independent of ®10.
22Case do
it = 1 :
When ®01 = 0, W1
0 (sit) = 1 and W1
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which identi¯es the misclassi¯cation probability ®10.
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27State 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Berlin 10.3 10.5 9.8 10.6 12.3 13.6 17.3 17.7
Schleswig-Holstein 10.8 10.3 9.6 7.3 8.3 9.1 11.2 10.6
Hamburg 12.0 13.6 11.7 8.7 8.6 10.7 13.0 11.7
Lower-Saxony 11.7 11.4 10.0 8.1 9.7 10.9 12.9 11.8
Bremen 14.5 15.6 14.6 10.7 12.4 14.0 16.8 16.8
North Rhine-Westphalia 10.7 11.0 10.0 7.9 9.6 10.6 12.2 11.2
Hess 7.0 6.7 6.1 5.1 7.0 8.4 10.1 9.4
Rhinel-Palatinate-Saarl. 9.4 9.1 7.8 6.1 8.3 9.2 11.0 9.7
Baden-Wuerttemberg 5.2 5.1 4.5 3.7 6.3 7.4 8.7 7.3
Bavaria 7.7 6.6 5.7 4.1 6.4 7.0 6.7 7.1
Table 3: Unemployment Rate per Wave and Land 1985-1999 Source: Statistiches Bundesamt
Deutschland
Immigrants West-Germans
Work No Yes Yes
Outmigration No No Yes
½"





















´1 0.068 0.061 0.042 0.118
(0.006) (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
¾2






w 0.033 0.037 0.037 0.074
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Log-likelihood -7137.81 -333.54 -701.76 -1372.04
Table 4: Covariance structure of the time variant and time invariant components. Asymptotic










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wife in Germany -0.692
(0.174)






Age at immigration /102 1.618
(0.755)




Table 6: Estimation results for return migration. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Wave
dummies were included for 1987-1997 but are not reported in the table.
Immigrants Germans
Sample Predictions IQR Earnings Sample Predictions IQR Earnings
1985 7,85 (0,84) 7,85 (0,84) 0,164 7,98 7,98 0,052
1987 7,93 (0,85) 7,94 (0,86) 0,183 8,10 8,09 0,052
1989 8,06 (0,85) 8,09 (0,84) 0,213 8,22 8,22 0,057
1991 8,16 (0,82) 8,20 (0,82) 0,229 8,31 8,31 0,057
1993 8,23 (0,78) 8,29 (0,77) 0.243 8,46 8,44 0,063
1995 8,29 (0,73) 8,38 (0,71) 0,289 8,50 8,49 0,069
1997 8,30 (0,70) 8,37 (0,70) 0,229 8,58 8,57 0,071
Table 7: Real and predicted log earnings of workers and work propensities for Germans and im-
migrants. Note: IQR: Di®erence between the 97.5 and 2.5 percentile of the predicted distribution.
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Figure 1: Log monthly earnings and work propensities - Germans and immigrants




















Figure 2: Real and simulated results for log earnings and work propensities
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